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Part One 
Introduction 
 
Our civic nationalism promotes internationalism; our independence movement 
embraces interdependence. We seek sovereignty, knowing that we will then 
choose to share that sovereignty.
1
 Alex Salmond  
Europe is currently experiencing a politically turbulent period in its recent history, 
economic instability precipitated by the Euro-crisis has provoked a questioning of the 
political merits of European integration and the European Union (EU) writ large across 
member states.
2 As the prognosticated ‘sleeping giant’ of Euro-scepticism3 gradually 
comes to the fore across Europe, with widespread discontent for the status quo with the 
structural deficits of the EU translating into electoral gains for anti-Euro and populist 
parties, it would appear antithetical in the current climate for a movement to campaign 
on more, not less, Europe.
4
 Taking into account the political situation currently 
engulfing European politics, at the national and supranational level, the opening quote 
by Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond stems the tide of opinion harboured by a 
disaffected public, the malaise typifying the response of established national parties and 
as a counter to anti-EU populist parties.
5
 A staunchly pro-European subnational 
movement vying for increased integration in the midst of a public crisis of confidence, 
emphasises that contrary to musings regarding the ‘paradox of separatism in the midst 
                                                          
1
 Salmond, A. (2014). ‘’Scotland’s Place in Europe.’’ Speech at the College of Europe, Brugge 28
th
 
April 2014. [Available at: https://www.coleurope.eu/speeches]  
2
 Kohut, A. et al (2013). The New Sick Man of Europe: European Union. Pew Research Centre, 
[Available at:http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/05/Pew-Research-Center-Global-Attitudes-
Project-European-Union-Report-FINAL-FOR-PRINT-May-13-2013.pdf] [Accessed: 18
 
Jan 2014]: 
& Zalewska, M. & Gstrein, O.J. (2013). National Parliaments and their Role in European 
Integration: The EU‘s Democratic Deficit in Times of Economic Hardship and Political Insecurity.  
Bruges Political Research Papers, 28, p.4. 
3
 van der Eijk, C. & Franklin, MN. (2004). Potential Contestation on European Matters at National 
Elections in Europe’:  In Marks, G. and Steenbergen, M.R (eds), European Integration and Political 
Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 32-50. 
4
 Parker, G. et al. (2014). UKIP and Front National Lead Populist Earthquake. Financial Times 
[online], May26
th
.[Availablwathttp://www.ft.com]  [Accessed: 27
 
May 2014] 
5
 Mair, Peter (2009). ‘Representative versus Responsible Government’, MPIfG Working Paper 09/8. 
Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 2009. p. 5. 
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of integration’ 6 that the current situation can be more aptly surmised as the paradox of 
separatism for integration.
7
 
 
In the wake of the impending and proposed referenda on Scottish and Catalonian 
independence the EU is a very relevant actor both for these movements and the nation 
states involved. With membership of the EU being used as a political tool to both 
legitimise and derail these movements they have become a critical actor in a political 
impasse between subnational and national governments, with significant influence to 
effect either outcome. The Scottish National Party’s (SNP) bid to convince voters on the 
laurels of independence from the United Kingdom in the upcoming referendum has taken 
on a decidedly European dimension. The assertion on the part of the SNP that an 
independent Scotland would automatically attain membership of the EU based on 
Continuity of Effect
8
 has been publically rejected by high profile figures within the EU 
jeopardizing the integrity of the SNPs campaign.
 9
  Secession within an EU member 
country is without precedent and has implications for likeminded movements such as that 
in Catalonia in Spain which is gaining momentum inspired by events in Scotland.
10
 The 
Catalonian case highlights the limitations of the EU in influencing the domestic 
constitutional competencies of the nation state. With calls for support from the EU to 
ameliorate the current constitutional stalemate regarding secession referenda between the 
Spanish state and Catalonian Government falling on deaf ears within the EU. 
11
 
                                                          
6
 ; Connolly, C. K. (2014). Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the European 
Union. Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 24 (51), p. 55. 
7
 Ibid, p. 53. & Laible, J. (2008). Separatism and Sovereignty in the New Europe: Party Politics and 
the Meanings of Statehood in a Supranational Context. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 4-5. 
8
 Scottish Government. (2013). Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland 
Edinburgh: Scottish Government, p.216. 
9
 Syal, R. (2014). Independent Scotland 'would find it extremely difficult to join EU'. The Guardian 
[online], 16th Feb. [Available: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/feb/16/independent-
scotland-extremely-difficult-join-eu] [Accessed: 15 Mar 2014] and The Economist. (2014). Homage 
to Catalonia. The Economist Newspaper Limited [online], 22
nd
 Feb. [Avaiable: 
www.economist.com][Accessed: 15 Mar 2014]. 
10
Connolly, Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the European Union, p. 60.  
11
 Perez, A. & Moffett, P. (2013). Almunia Says Catalonia Would Need to Leave EU if it Secedes 
From Spain: Comments Disappoint Catalan Secessionists. Wall Street Journal [online],  16
th
 
September. [Available: www.wallstreetjournal.com] [Accessed: 20 June 2014]: Traynor, I. (2012). 
Catalan leader Artur Mas Presses EU on Secession Issue. The Guardian [online],   7
th
 March. 
[Available: www.theguardian.com] [Accessed: 20 June 2014]. & Moffertt, M. (2014). Catalonia's 
European Election Litmus Test: European Parliament Election on Sunday Will Serve as a Test of 
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Motivated by these unfolding events I will investigate to what extent supranational 
organisations (EU) really empower subnational secessionist movements in the form of 
political parties, in this case the SNP in Scotland and Convergence and Union (CiU) in 
Spain. Examining the relationship between subnational secessionist movements and the 
EU with emphasis on how the EU, with increasing integration, has empowered regions 
through available opportunity structures above that of the state. My specific research 
question is: to what extent does the European Union empower subnational movements? 
 
The thesis will argue that there is a limit to how much the EU really empowers 
subnational movements, and that in terms of fulfilling subnational aspirations for 
regionalist movements the EU is a reluctant ally.
12
 Despite the pro-European rhetoric and 
ideology which characterises many subnational movements, the argument rests on the 
dichotomy between how they mobilize European integration as a cornerstone of their 
nationalist platform but the seeming unwillingness on the part of the EU to openly 
support this agenda in these states.
13
 
I will demonstrate that there are three dimensions to subnational empowerment, firstly  in 
the opportunity structures facilitated by the EU, the national context of these subnational 
movements and lastly but perhaps most crucial the process of political isolation. The 
principle argument of the thesis is a simple one, that political isolation in the national 
sphere and the opportunity structures of the EU is the mechanism driving secession in 
my chosen cases.  Political isolation of subnational parties has contributed to a self-
fulfilling prophecy on behalf of nation states, by fortifying their power as the primary 
actor in the EU at the determinant of subnational parties they have compelled these 
parties to seek independence. National governments consecrating their status as the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Strength for Secessionist Parties. Wall Street Journal [online], 23
rd
 May. [Available: 
www.wallstreetjournal.com] [Accessed: 20 June 2014].  
     
12
 An example being the attempt made by subnational governments to shape the 2004 European Constitution 
having marked limited success in trying to gain a stronger voice for regions. These movements saw the 
Constitution as a document consecrating ‘a two level game between the EU and the state.’ This caused a dilemma 
for subnational movements, as they could not support a document that constitutionally diminished their status 
whilst publically rejecting it would have contradicted their pro-European stance.
 
See: Lecours, A. (2012). Sub-
state Nationalism in the Western World: Explaining Continued Appeal. Ethnopolitics, 11 (3), p. 281. & Keating, 
M. (2004). European Integration and the Nationalities Question. Politics & Society, 32 (3), p. 382. 
13
 Jolly, S. (2007). The Europhile Fringe?: Regionalist Party Support for European Integration. 
European Union Politics, 8 (1),  p. 109-130 
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primary actor in the European Union has demonstrated to subnational parties that the 
only means to achieve adequate representation is to not transcend the status quo, but join 
it.
14
 The opportunity structures for subnational parties facilitated by the EU provide 
inadequate access to the decision making process for these movements, the EU have not 
enabled these subnational parties to gain a seat at the table of decision making which 
satisfies their agenda fuelling the need for secession.  
Overall this thesis finds that the EU both empowers and delimits the power of 
subnational secession  movements. This paradox can be observed over time by analysing 
the relationship between all actors involved using the three dimensions of empowerment: 
national context, opportunity structures and political isolation. Surmised by analysing the 
chronological political events and processes concerning all actors involved:  CiU, SNP, 
the British and Spanish Governments and EU institutions.  
 
Globalization and Political Awakening: the European Union, 
Nation States and Subnational Movements 
Multilevel Governance… a system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, national, regional and local 
- as the result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation 
that has pulled some previously centralised functions of the state up to the 
supranational level and some down to the local/regional level
15
 Gary Marks  
This literature review will act as a theoretical preface to the thesis in order to introduce 
the key concepts and ideas that will underpin forthcoming analysis. Addressing how the 
process of globalization has changed the political landscape for all actors in the 
international system, the review will explore how the EU is the forum for this political 
change. How political opportunity structures have endowed subnational movements with 
the agency to participate in the system and pursue independence, and how this process is 
perceived by national governments. Fundamental to this appreciation of the EU is an 
                                                          
14
 Connolly, Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the European Union, p. 60-61.  
15
 Marks (1993), Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EU, p. 392.  
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understanding of the phenomenon which has enabled sub nationalism to flourish and 
drives secessionist aspirations; globalization is cited as the foremost factor contributing 
to the ‘political awakening’ of nationalist movements throughout and specifically in the 
latter half of the 20
th
 century. 
16
  Globalization is the term coined for the process whereby 
‘increased flows of goods, services, capital, people, and information’17cross borders and 
more specifically to political commentary as ‘the intensification of world-wide social 
relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by 
events occurring many miles away and visa versa.’18The prevailing argument posits 
globalization as the central phenomenon that ‘has led to the rise of sub-state 
nationalism … [providing] minority nationalists with opportunities to promote their sub-
state nationalist agenda in developed countries.’19 To this effect globalization acts as the 
linchpin driving the phenomena of resurgent sub-state nationalism.
20
  
The European Union, sui generis, as the archetype of multilevel governance (MLG)
21
, 
epitomising the complex political and economic interdependence that characterises the 
contemporary international system, is a forum for understanding the relationship between 
the myriad of actors that comprise the international political and economic arena. The EU 
is not merely one body of governance but a heterogeneous synthesis of interconnected 
but distinct actors incorporating a variety of forms and competencies from the member 
state to the regional office, historic nation to city region, and supranational European 
                                                          
16
 Guibernau, Nations Without States: Political Communities in a Global Age, p. 89. 
17
 Jacoby, W., & Meunier, S. (2010). Europe and the Management of Globalization. Journal Of 
European Public Policy, 17 (3), p. 299. 
18
 Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge Polity Press, p. 64. 
19
 Anaid, A. (2014). Globalisation and Sub-State Nationalism: A Review and Analysis of the 
Interrelations Between Globalisation and the Rise of Minority Nationalism. European Scientific 
Journal, 10 (8),  p. 377. 
20
 Kohler-Koch, B. (1996). Catching up with Change: the Transformation of Governance in the 
European Union. Journal Of European Public Policy, 3(3), p.  359-380. 
21
 Multilevel Governance coined and developed by Marks to explain the new system of governance 
created by the EU, can be viewed as the institutional manifestation of globalization with European 
integration acting as a congruent process. First implicitly in: Marks, G. (1992), “Structural Policy in 
the European Community”, in ASbragi (ed.), The Political Consequences of 1992 for the European 
Community, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, p. 192. And then explicitly in: Marks G. 
(1993), “Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EU”, in A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal 
(eds.), The State of the European Community, New York, Lynne Rienner, p. 392. 
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council to local county council.
 22
   Far from facilitating the creation of a homogenous 
pan-European culture and tier of government 
23
 the EU, through increased European 
integration, has overseen and become the forum for the expansion of political agency 
above that of the state for a host of formally isolated actors.
24
 
This agency is gleaned from the multitude of new opportunity structures available for 
actors, these range from the economic, such as structural development funds for 
economically disadvantaged regions, to the political, such as the Committee of the 
Regions (CoR) for political representation in the EU for all levels of subnational 
governance. This new European architecture of opportunity structures beyond the state 
has been exploited most by stateless nations, regional governments in devolved states, 
who view the EU as a means to bypass their respective national governments sometimes 
perceived as ‘old centers of repression and control.’ 25 In the eyes of subnational 
movements the supranational opportunity structures of the EU gives them another avenue 
to pursue their agendas from ‘enhancing… autonomy and achieving greater national self-
determination and recognition’26to grounding support for secession from the nation state 
in a supranational framework.
 27
 
How national and subnational governments view the EU and globalization more 
generally is an important consideration in context to this thesis, as such an evaluation of 
the national and subnational positions are important to note. Contemporary political 
analysis of European integration, especially in the popular media, focuses on the divisive 
impacts of the EU, such as the diminishing of national sovereignty, the decline of the 
                                                          
22
 Keating & Hooghe,  Bypassing the Nation-State? Regions and the EU Policy Process, p. 283: 
Keating, M. (2006). Europe, the State and the Nation. In: Mcgarry, J. & Keating, M. eds. (2006). 
European Integration and the Nationalities Question. London: Routledge, p. 30-32.  
23
 The Committee of the Regions. (2009). The Committee of the Regions White Paper on Multilevel 
Governance. Brussels: European Union, p. 4.  
24
 Agency, defined as ‘an actor’s ability to make meaningful choices… the actor is able to envisage 
options and make a choice.’ Alsop & Heinsohn, Measuring Empowerment in Practice: Structuring 
Analysis and Framing Indicators, p. 6. 
25
 Sabanadze, N. (2010). Globalization and Nationalism: The Cases of Georgia and the Basque 
Country. Budapest: Central European University Press, p. 116. 
26
 Ibid, p. 116. 
27
 Keating, M. (1997). Stateless Nation-Building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in the Changing 
State System. Nations and Nationalism, 3 (4),  p. 689-717: Chacha, M. (2012). Regional Attachment 
and Support for European Integration. European Union Politics, 14 (2), p. 206-227: Hooghe, L. & 
Marks, G. (1996) ‘Europe with the Regions’: Channels of Regional Representation within the 
European Union, Publius, 26, p. 73–9.  
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unitary-state model of governance and the socio-economic merits of an interdependent 
and inclusive European polity.
28
 This rhetoric posits that nation-states, and specifically 
national parliaments, are the victims or losers of European integration due to the ‘gradual 
process of de-democratization’29 that it supposedly entails. The main argument follows 
that the traditional model of governance is being undermined at a subnational (below) 
and supranational (above) level owing to globalization; this is due to the fact that under 
this process  ‘European national governments have become too small for certain policy 
prerogatives and too big for others.
30
 
Globalization and the process of integration can be characterized as a ‘blend of threat and 
opportunity’31 for all actors in the EU as ‘it creates both opportunities and costs.’32 The 
fear that globalization and increased integration will combine to proliferate a 
homogenous society, with a uniformed pan-European identity, supplanting the diversity 
of traditional identity coupled with the diminishing of the traditional mode of governance 
is persuasive. However the opportunities that can be gleaned from this integration, 
through increased market penetration as an example, acts to assuage the fears of political 
commentators but only to a degree, instead attaching the conditional connotations of 
‘globalization with adjectives’ (such as restrained or managed) to the discourse.33 To this 
effect the EU, as forum directing integration, can be ‘seen as an effort to manage the 
                                                          
28
 As Vogelgesang and Scharkow state ‘the comparatively low-level of Europeanization in the news 
media is said to promote Euro-skepticism or at least hinder further integration.’ Scharkow, M. & 
Vogelgesang, J. (2007). Effects of Domestic Media Use on European Integration? Paper presented at 
the 60th annual WAPOR conference, ‘Public Opinion and the Challenges of the 21st Century,’ 
Berlin, p. 1. Also see: Trenz, H.J. (2008).Understanding Media Impact on European Integration: 
Enhancing or Restricting the Scope of Legitimacy of the EU? Journal of European Integration, 30 
(2), p. 291-309.  
29
 Zalewska, M. & Gstrein, O.J. (2013). National Parliaments and their Role in European Integration: 
The EU‘s Democratic Deficit in Times of Economic Hardship and Political Insecurity.  Bruges 
Political Research Papers, 28, p. 7.  
30
 Alesina, A. and Spolaore, E. (2003). The Size of Nations. Boston: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, p. 213-214. 
31
 Jacoby, W., & Meunier, S, Europe and the Management of Globalization,  p. 299. 
32
 Alberti, A. & Bertucci, G. (2003). Globalization and the Role of the State: Challenges and 
Perspectives, in  Rondinelli, D. A. & Cheema, G. S. Reinventing Government for the Twenty-First 
Century: State Capacity in a Globalizing Society. Kumarian Press, p. 1. 
33
 Jacoby, W., & Meunier, S, Europe and the Management of Globalization,  p. 299. 
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eroding powers of national states, to manage the creation of an integrated market, and to 
manage the ‘pooling’ of national sovereignty.’34 
Subnational governments, unlike central governments, view the process in much more 
progressive terms. Whilst national governments have employed globalization with 
adjectives, a reticent and skeptical approach to the process, subnational governments, 
whilst also harboring similar reservations at the onset of the process have transcended 
these initial doubts.
35
 The EU can be seen to represent two contradictory positions 
regarding substate nationalism. Firstly, the antithetical argument, the discursive argument 
of nation-states, maintains that ‘the logic of nationalism goes against the logic of 
integration’36  that owing to the pluralistic nature of the EU, such as the pooling of 
national sovereignty fostered by the EU
37
, integration goes against the very fundamental 
nature of nationalism as a ‘political principle, that holds that the national and political 
unit should be congruent.’ 38 
The opposing argument, which coincides with the substate position, states that the 
political and economic opportunity structures facilitated by institutionalized, managed 
globalization have allowed subnational actors to transcend the state. The political and 
socio-economic demarcation from the unitary state-centric model of governance, 
precipitated by the EU, has created a system which  ‘puts a shadow on the prominence of 
the state and favors instead a system of multilevel governance where regions and self-
declared stateless nations… assume agency.’ 39  This opportunity to assume a more 
prominent role in the international community is two-fold; firstly the political structure of 
the EU has allowed them more access to decision-making and another forum in which to 
                                                          
34
 Ibid, p. 304. 
35
 The European Economic Community (EEC), later becoming the EU,  was unpopular with 
nationalist movements who viewed it as ‘remote, beurocrativc and unsympathetic to nationality 
claims.’ Keating, Europe, the State and the Nation, p. 30. & Smith, J. (2012). Special Issue: Forty 
years on: the UK and Europe Introduction. International Affairs, 88 (6), p. 1186-1187. 
36
 Ibid. p, 281.  
37
 Hoppe, M. (2005). Sub-State Nationalism and European Integration: Constructing Identity in the 
Multi-Level Political Space of Europe. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 1 (2), p. 13- 
28. 
38
 Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty in the New Europe: Party Politics and the Meanings of 
Statehood in a Supranational Context, p. 4-5. 
39
 Lecours, Sub-state Nationalism in the Western World: Explaining Continued Appeal,  p. 281. Also 
see: Hepburn, E. (2010) Using Europe: territorial party strategies in a multi-level system. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
MSc Thesis 
Friend or Foe? The European Union and Subnational Independence Movements 
Thomas E. C. Scarff  
14
th
 July 2014 
 
 
13 
 
operate outside of national political arena. And secondly are the economic benefits of the 
European Union.  
Viability theory is key to understanding the drive of subnational parties independence 
aspirations, this is due to the idea that ‘once a region is a member of large common 
market, including even a common currency area, and can enjoy free trade… the national 
government is much less important for the economy of the region.’40 Small states, owing 
to globalisation, can thus transcend the traditional constraints set by nation states. The 
contemporary economic and political conditions precipitated by supranational 
governance and economic interdependence allow small nations to be ‘viable’ in an 
international system that is ‘no longer the monopoly of the state.’41 As economic and 
political integration increases so do the ‘incentives for the region to seek independence or 
autonomy’42 such is the case in the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Spain and Belgium.43  
Accordingly, regional parties ‘have adapted their discourse to incorporate the concepts of 
Europe and Europeanization [using this new platform to] pursue roles within the process 
of European integration.’ 44   During the preceding two decades, since the onset of 
political and economic EU enlargement, subnational parties have made European 
integration, increasing the scope of political and socio-economic engagement, a key 
tenant of their entire platform.
45
 During this time ‘regionalist political parties [have been] 
consistently pro-EU across time, space, and issue area.’46 For subnational parties the 
assertion is ‘that viability theory lies at the heart of [their] Regionalist Europhilia’47 with 
                                                          
40
 Alesina, A. and Spolaore, E. (2003). The Size of Nations. Boston: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, p. 213-214. 
41
 Guibernau, M. (1999). Nations Without States: Political Communities in a Global Age. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 22.  
42
 Ibid. p, 214.  
43
 Holitscher, M. & R. Suter. (1999). The Paradox of Economic Globalization and Political 
Fragmentation: Secessionist Movements in Quebec and Scotland. Global Society, 13 (3), p. 257.  
44
 Giordano, B. & Roller, E. (2002). Catalonia and the 'Idea of Europe': Competing Strategies and 
Discourses within Catalan Party Politics. European Urban and Regional Studies, 9 (2), p.  99. 
45
 The history of SNP and CiU attitudes to European integration will be developed in the main body 
of text.  
46
 Jolly, The Europhile Fringe?: Regionalist Party Support for European Integration, p. 109. 
47
 Ibid. p. 111.  
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the centrality of this conceptual framework acting as the modus operandi of these parties 
directing increased integration and independence.
48
 
Theory 
Empowerment 
An essential basis to this thesis is the idea of empowerment, how are subnational actors 
empowered by the EU?
49
 A definition of the concept of empowerment in this context 
requires examining power. Page and Czuba state that empowerment depends on two 
things, firstly that empowerment rests on the requirement of power to change and 
secondly that power can expand. Simply put ‘if power cannot change, if it is inherent in 
positions or people, then empowerment is not possible, nor is empowerment conceivable 
in any meaningful way. In other words, if power can change, then empowerment is 
possible’50  This may seem a simple and obvious statement however it is pivotal to 
understanding empowerment.
51
 Central to this understanding of empowerment is power, 
and more specifically, how power changes in relationships between actors.  In the 
context of the research question, to what extent does the European Union empower 
subnational movements?, Kreisberg offers an applicable definition of power as ‘the 
capacity to implement’52which according to Page and Czuba ‘is broad enough to allow 
power to mean domination, authority and influence… It is this definition of power, as a 
process that occurs in relationships, that gives us the possibility of empowerment.’53 
Taking into account the importance of power, and a change of power, in relationships 
between actors this thesis will analyze empowerment of subnational movements in 
                                                          
48
 Focusing on the SNP as a case study, Jolly, shows how the party have framed their policy of 
independence in Europe based on the economic viability of small states in an integrated market. 
49
 Despite explicitly mentioning the concept in the titles many articles fail to qualify empowerment: 
Smyrl, M. E. (1997). Does European community regional policy empower the regions?. 
Governance, 10 (3), p. 287-309: Bache, I and Jones, R. (2000). Has EU Regional Policy Empowered 
the Regions? A Study of Spain and the United Kingdom. Regional & Federal Studies, 10 (3), p. 1-
20. 
50
 Page, N. and Czuba, C. (1999). Empowerment: What is it? Journal of Extension, 37 (5), p. 1-2 
51
 Munck, G. (2005). Measuring Democratic Governance: Central Tasks and Basic Problems. In D. 
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relation to how the scope of its power, influence, has been affected by the EU over time. 
By means of operationalizing the measurement of this process this thesis will investigate 
and analyze three areas which influence a change of power for subnational movements 
and where the extent of change can be observed: opportunity structures, national context and 
political isolation.   
Opportunity Structures  
Opportunity structures, defined by Aslop and Heinsohn ‘as the formal and informal 
contexts within which actors operate,’54is the most pertinent forum to direct observing a 
possible change in power of subnational movements in relation to the EU. The 
opportunity structures available to subnational movements have to be under the 
prerogative of the EU or have recognized formal or informal access to the decision-
making process. I have identified the opportunity structure, comprising the main 
discernable actors in the sphere of influence of subnational parties, as:
55
 
1. The Committee of the Regions (CoR)  
2. Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers)  
3. European Parliament (EP)  
4. European Commission (EC) 
5. Brussels Regional Offices  
 
The rationale behind basing the opportunity structure on institutions of the EU, quasi-
institutions and subnational lobbying relies on the centrality of these bodies for 
implementing a change in power,
56
 as Harty states, ‘institutions play an important role in 
shaping the strategic action undertaken by actors to realize their preferences.’57 Although 
referencing national institutions’ role in nation building for subnational movements, 
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framed in terms of national competencies, Harty omits the role of the EU in grounding 
and European integration in driving sub state nationalist culture.  As has been established, 
Europe, for the concerned subnational movements is a means to transcend the state, not 
merely in governance but more pertinently in culture as the inclusion of a European 
identity allows for the weaning of political culture and identity away from that of the 
nation-state.
58
 Echoing the assertion of Harty that ‘institutions are the resources that 
permit rulers to create and reproduce a national culture.’59 For subnational movements 
these institutions ‘create space for the articulation of sub-state identities within a 
European framework.’60  
Subnational parties have developed the European dimension of national politics 
strategically into a boundary marker, ‘to stress their difference from other political 
parties and also from their respective central nations.’61 With Europe taking on a more 
salient role in identity formulation and political expression, with increased representation 
or membership being the ultimate goal of these movements, participation in institutions 
of the EU "act as … the goals toward which political actors strive or the best means to 
achieve these ends."
62
 Taking into consideration how the opportunity structures 
facilitated by the EU are central to the aspirations of subnational movements, using these 
institutions as a means to measure empowerment will give this study a focused measure 
of empowerment.  
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National Context  
Subnational movements operate both in the national and supranational political milieu 
thus the extent of autonomy the region enjoys in deference to their national governments 
is an important factor in measuring potential empowerment. Despite both Catalonia and 
Scotland having varying degrees of autonomy from the nation state, with competencies 
over a vast range of domestic policy areas such as law, education and health through the 
process of decentralization, the transferring of ‘political, financial, administrative, and 
legal authority from a central government to regional/ subnational and local 
governments,’63 subnational governments are still deferential to national governments in 
others, defense, foreign affairs etc. The national delineation of regional power is still 
import as despite the opportunity structures facilitated by the EU the nation state still 
controls access.  
National governments in this regard are the gatekeepers for subnational movements, 
residing at the apex of executive control they have considerable, in many cases, power 
over the constitutional arrangement of the nation.
64
 Whilst many national governments 
have further augmented the process of decentralization in the preceding few decades 
many still retain constitutional authority. To this effect the nation state is a very 
important actor in relation to not merely supranational access for subnational movements 
but in deciding the scope of these movements ranging from the amount of autonomy they 
can enjoy in differing policy areas to the legitimacy of separation and independence, to 
this effect national governments still have ‘control over the rules of the game.’65 This is 
underscored by the assertion that ‘the strength of regions in their state’s EU 
policymaking and implementation seems to vary based on the political strength of the 
regions overall.’66 Keating expands on this point, regions can be empowered by the EU 
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to implement agency however ‘provided they first achieve victory in domestic 
constitutional arenas.’67 
Political practice in the international and European sphere backs the assertion, that 
although the EU and globalization has allowed for the resurgence of sub nationalist 
movements, the state is still very much the principle actor in international and European 
politics. The determination placed on the new prominence of sub and supranational 
political competencies in spite of the nation state can be viewed as media sensationalism, 
within the literature contending with MLG and globalization the role of nation state is 
not completely defunct, echoing the assertion made by Keohane and Nye that ‘contrary 
to some prophetic views, the nation state is not about to be replaced as the primary 
instrument of domestic and global governance.’68 The fact that the EU ‘as an association 
of sovereign national States (Staatenverbund)’…  is not a state by itself –  [and that ] it 
derives its sovereign authority exclusively from the legislative power of its Member 
States’ 69  is supportive of Keohane and Nye’s assertion. 70  Keating and Hooghe’s 
analysis of the role of Europe of the Regions and subnational government more 
generally also backs the prominence of the state in international affairs stating  that  ‘the 
nation state remains the primary actor in the EU.’71  
 
Although the state still retains a central role in EU and international affairs as detailed in 
the previous paragraphs the impact of MLG  has put considerable strain on national 
governments and that ‘far from being efficient and effective gatekeepers straddling the 
threshold between their national boundaries and the Community, national governments 
[instead] more closely resemble the juggler who must apply himself simultaneously to 
the tasks of keeping several balls in the air and not losing his balance on the rotating 
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platform.’72 National governments have had to adapt to the influx of a variety of new 
actors operating in the political sphere, not merely subnational governments but 
lobbying and interest groups, EU and International institutions, treaties and external 
laws and courts. The national context is a pivotal pillar of measuring subnational 
empowerment, understanding the constraints on and imposed by national governments 
allows for a fuller appreciation of subnational empowerment.  
 
Political Isolation  
Central to understanding empowerment, and the impetus for secession, is the concept of 
political isolation, this ‘implies that a sub-state group enjoys a political role less than 
what it may feel appropriate.’73 This political role can be within their respective state, 
such as an increase in domestic legislative or executive competencies, self-rule, or to 
‘some entity beyond the state’74 such as the EU. Whilst many subnational governments 
have been granted considerable legislative and executive competencies in their own 
respective regions this has not always been extended to the supranational or even 
national level. Political isolation is an important consideration when examining 
subnational movements future ambitions verses their current competencies, much more 
than the EU, national parliaments have significant authority to derail these movements.  
Political isolation and agency can be seen as mutually exclusive, agency being defined as 
‘an actor’s ability to make meaningful choices; that is, the actor is able to envisage 
options and make a choice.’75 If subnational parties feel that their current role is less than 
what they desire, and they cannot ameliorate this through lobbying for incremental 
changes in the system to suit their agenda then their only choice is to fundamentally 
change their position within the current framework. Thus political isolation is 
fundamentally a mechanism, a substate group who feels that their current status in the 
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system is less than what they feel appropriate will be compelled to act to change their 
status. The main thrust of the argument will be that political isolation is pivotal in 
understanding the impetus of subnational parties to secede and acts as the motivation for 
parties to transcend their current situation. Through using political isolation as an 
independent variable of empowerment we can observe how political isolation occurs 
through opportunity structures and in the national context, linking the theory together. 
Hypotheses  
The thesis will set out to establish why secession from the nation state in a European 
context for subnational movements has come to the fore in the chosen cases of Catalonia 
and Scotland over the preceding decades. Establishing the opportunity structures in 
which these movements operate and connecting how political isolation has exacerbated 
the move towards full independence will enable this study to understand what processes 
have triggered this move. The thesis will seek to demonstrate that the opportunity 
structures available, such as the quasi-institutional Committee of the Regions (CoR), 
established to give regions a stronger voice have failed to deliver adequate access to the 
decision making process. This coupled with the disparity in national competencies for 
devolved regions and their ability to access the decision making process in the EU by 
national governments have both precipitated the need for these movements to attempt to 
attain equal footing with nation states, gaining independence and thus full membership of 
the EU to achieve these goals.
76
  
These insights lead to a central argument, that current opportunity structures are 
inadequate for larger subnational movements in facilitating access to the decision-making 
process, precipitating the need for full membership of the EU as a member state. H1: 
Greater political isolation precipitates an increased drive for autonomy and secession for 
subnational governments.  
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Research Design 
Methods:  
What needs to be addressed is to what extent theoretical processes have resulted in a 
pragmatic change in power for these movements; how the opportunity structures, driven 
by political isolation, have precipitated the need for an increase in representation. In 
order to do this one must assess the level to which political isolation is prevalent in the 
system and how it influences the drive towards independence for subnational groups. In 
equal measure, understanding what role the EU plays in assuaging subnational 
movements, acting as a mediator between them and national governments is an important 
factor in understanding the potential empowerment of subnational movements. The 
independent variables will be used to test to what extent empowerment of subnational 
movements, the dependent variable, is occurring. The independent variable for this thesis 
will be political isolation as covered in the theory section. Political isolation will be 
measured through examining each subnational parties relationship in the national context 
and the available opportunity structures.  
 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable 
 
Empowerment of Subnational Movements  
 
Political Isolation 
 
Case Studies and Case Selection  
Drawing upon Keating and Hooghe’s assertion regarding the complexity of territorial 
politics in the EU, careful case selection is vital for the successful answering of the 
research question and hypothesis. The EU, far from facilitating the creation of a 
homogeneous tier of regional government, has instead overseen a persevering 
heterogeneous composition of regional governance incorporating a variety of forms and 
competencies ranging from historic nations, cities, city regions and units in federal or 
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quasi-federal states.
77
  Owing to this the need to first choose applicable cases from the 
myriad of options available and then to qualify why those cases have been chosen from 
the multitude of options is paramount insofar as to avoid oversight. Taking into 
consideration the research question and hypothesis the two cases that have been chosen 
for analysis rests on their relevance in the contemporary debate, both for precedent and 
in the proceeding processes. The case studies chosen in the United Kingdom, Scotland, 
and Spain, Catalonia, are not merely for current relevance, although their prevalence 
does give them weight as examples, but what their contrasting, yet similar, experience 
can glean in analysis providing insights into the central theory of this thesis. That 
political isolation motivates secession. Both Scotland and Catalonia are the most 
pertinent examples of subnational actors vying for a seat at the table of EU decision-
making, within the literature both cases are prolifically employed as examples of 
stateless nations, defined as  ‘are well-defined territories with unique historical, cultural, 
economic, and political identities… [maintaining] their unique identities despite being 
incorporated for long periods of time within larger states.’78 Their nationalist aspirations 
are similar regarding Europe but their relationships with their respective national 
governments differ.   
Recent events in Catalonia, inspired by Scotland, have also given this region a more 
prominent place in the debate.
79
 Owing to this Catalonia and Scotland alike offer a very 
applicable window into examining how subnational movements are empowered by the 
EU. The ‘British government’s willingness to recognize Scotland as a nation and its 
readiness to allow a referendum on Scottish independence in 2014… [stands] in sharp 
contrast to the Spanish position to forbid a referendum on Catalan independence.’’80 
This mirrors the scenario of a failed bid by the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) to have 
an independence referendum in 2008, something that the CiU have taken into account 
and attempted to ameliorate with EU lobbying. Rejecting the referendum based on 
constitutional grounds emphasizes the centrality of the state as a gatekeeper, the 
response from the EU only reinforces this as the EU is not prepared to endorse the 
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Catalonian call to rally around the flag of national self-determination. Similarly, the 
response from the EU in terms of the Scottish independence debate has tended to side 
with national governments, in effect they are singing from the same hymn sheet in 
response to these nationalist claims.  
In terms of qualifying what a subnational movement represents this thesis will use 
political parties as the principle actor in these movements. Nationalist/ regionalist parties 
have had and continue to exert a significant amount of influence in their respective 
regions and national political arenas.  This is due to their ability to bring ‘national 
identity and territorial politics to the fore’81 and to force statewide parties to take regional 
issues more seriously, as ‘the presence of nationalist parties as electoral competitors 
obliges established statewide parties to create regional governments in order to defeat the 
nationalists.’82 Subnational political parties have allowed for a discursive space to open 
in which nationalist and regionalist claims take on a new prominence. Owing to this the 
decision to focus on these parties rests on them being the main driving forces behind 
secession campaigns, providing the institutional leverage to effect change such as; setting 
referendums, heading regional governments, participate in national, regional and 
European elections and send representatives to the CoR.  The parties concerned, SNP and 
CiU, are both currently the dominant political parties in their regions, heading devolved 
governments and have all framed independence within a European context .
83
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The argument will posit that political isolation is the causal mechanism motivating 
secession in these two cases, both the SNP and CiU are alienated from Europe both 
nationally and through the opportunity structures available to them thus are forced to 
transcend their current position with both calling for independence from the central state. 
This makes them not only relevant and interesting cases to explore but very applicable to 
the central argument of this essay: that subnational movements are not sufficiently 
empowered by the architecture of EU opportunity structures or their national 
governments necessitating the need for independence. 
Part Two: Analysis 
Subnational Party’s and European Integration 
 
The following two sections will briefly contend with the background of the two chosen 
case studies of Convergence and Union (CiU) in Catalonia and the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) in Scotland. Broadly outlining the history each party has had with the 
European Union to relate to the central research question, ‘to what extent does the 
European Union empower subnational movements?’  
 
The Scottish National Party, National Context and ‘Independence in 
Europe’   
The national context is vitally important in recognising the impetuous for the transition 
from a Eurosceptic to distinctly Europhile party in the case of the Scottish National 
Party and in the importance of the EU opportunity structures to their agenda. The 
introduction of European opportunity structures allowed for the SNP to transition to this 
stance, before perceiving the European Economic Community (forbearer to the EU) as 
‘centralist and elitist’84 with it being ‘unclear to the party how Scottish interests would 
be represented.’85 The nationalist movement in Scotland, headed by the SNP, can be 
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seen to really pick up proceeding the discovery of oil in the North Sea during the 1970s 
which ‘led many nationalists to argue for greater Scottish control over its own resources 
and revenues and to claim that Scotland could survive economically as an independent 
state’86 used as an argument began to garner support from the public. However in the 
1980s North Sea Oil, owned and operated primarily by British Companies, was no 
longer enough to use as an argument for independence. In keeping with their previous 
stance the SNP switched from using oil to see the expanding European Community as 
an area in which to ground viability for secession.  
Owing to the ‘closed’ opportunities for increased representation in the then increasingly 
Eurosceptic and hostile national political sphere the SNP saw Europe as an alternative 
arena in which to bypass a stalemate in popular support and in gaining representation in 
the national arena. ‘[Adopting] the slogan ‘’independence in Europe’’ arguing that 
Scotland should be a full member state of the European Union’ 87 recognising that 
increased European integration and a place in an alternative political arena was positive 
for smaller nations in gaining more political recognition and influence. 
88
Since the late 
1980s Europe has become the critical pillar in the SNPs platform for independence from 
the UK, using it explicitly ‘to frame independence as a more viable constitutional option 
to garner support for its movement’89 with ‘the slogan of Scotland in Europe [being] 
used strategically by nationalists to assuage the concerns of potential supporters 
insecure about independence from London.’90  
For the SNP the national context as well as access to the opportunity structures of the 
EU is acutely important in determining the extent of political isolation, providing 
leverage to argue for H1. This political isolation can be seen to stem from the lack of 
access to the decision-making process (opportunity structures) which is informed 
primarily by the centrality of the state, as a gatekeeper to access, in the EU. 
91
 The 
stipulation by Jolly that ‘the SNP pays great attention to its potential representation 
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effectiveness within the EU’92 shows the central importance of the EU to the SNP 
agenda, thus access to the EU through the use of opportunity structures is an important 
part of their platform. In the analysis of opportunity structures to follow a lack of 
representation for the SNP in the EU would be indicative of H1, with political isolation 
from such a pivotal cornerstone of their nationalist agenda fuelling the need for 
secession.  
Convergence and Union, Political Isolation and the Spanish State  
The Catalonian case highlights how political isolation in the national context can cause 
an increase in the motivation for a subnational movement to secede from the nation state. 
Akin to Scotland, the CiU had to forge a platform in which to garner nationalist support 
however under very different circumstances. Under the Franco regime Catalonian social 
and political culture was rigorously repressed, Catalonian institutions were banned and 
the Catalonian language at the end of the regime was ‘on the brink of disappearing.’93 
After the Franco led dictatorship ended and democratic rule, including the Statutes of 
Autonomy (granting varying degrees of autonomy to historic Spanish regions), was 
reinstated to Spain in 1980 the CiU, heading the Catalonian Government  in exile in 
France, retuned to head the Catalonian Government. The newly elected CiU 
government had the arduous task of rebuilding the Catalonian nation and political 
culture in the wake of Francoism, this  ‘nation-building process focused upon the re-
establishment of Catalan institutions, the promotion of the Catalan language and the 
construction of a novel Catalan identity.’94 Despite committing to work alongside the 
Spanish state, identity formulation was also crafted in a European context, with the CiU 
wanting to create a relationship with the quickly expanding political scope of the 
European Community. This being a popular move amongst the Spanish people, and 
notably the Catalonians, with the burgeoning European Community thriving 
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economically and increasing its political scope it provided an alternative arena in which 
to advance and promote Catalonian culture .
95
  
 
The CiU has ‘been a strong advocate of Catalan autonomy but has typically stopped 
short of separation,’96 in contrast to the SNP, as they endeavored to ‘work within the 
parameters of [the Spanish] political structure.’97This relationship has however changed  
in the face of political isolation for the CiU in its attempts to further their agenda. The 
failure of the Spanish state to recognize Catalonia as a nation and in opposing further 
devolution are the main areas of contention in this relationship which has exacerbated 
secessionist claims. 98  The contention surrounding the 2006 amended Statute of 
Autonomy is cited as causing this change from the status quo in Catalan-Spanish 
relations, with the document ‘expanding the authority of the Generalitat and, most 
contentiously, defined Catalonia as a “nation.’’’99Many elements of Statute being stuck 
down in the Spanish Constitutional Court causing widespread Catalan disillusionment 
with the Spanish State and an increased vigor towards independence within Europe. 
100
The Spanish state has also blocked much activity for Catalonia in the opportunity 
structures of the EU, another point of contention owing to the centrality of Europe to the 
CiU nationalist platform. 
 
In terms of relating to the central research question and hypothesis, Catalonia can be 
seen to mirror the experience of Scotland. An increase in political isolation both in the 
national context and in the formal opportunity structures of the EU would indicate a 
drive towards a call for secession from the central state. I feel that the experience of 
Catalonia fits this model, with increased calls for autonomy and recognition being met 
with resistance by the Spanish state, coupled with the lack of formal opportunities in the 
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EU,  the CiU has been compelled to seek secession to ameliorate their current position 
owing to political isolation by the Spanish state.   
Opportunity Structures 
The following analysis will cover the aforementioned opportunity structures available 
for subnational movements to assess the extent to which they empower these 
movements. Firstly detailing how they may be perceived to empower subnational 
movements by providing an alternative avenue of influence above that of the nation 
state and then assessing how in practice these opportunity structures have been 
perceived and then utilized by the SNP and CiU to the benefit of their nationalist 
agendas.  
The Committee of the Regions (CoR)  
Agency to bypass the state and participate in the EU decision-making process for 
subnational actors can be seen to be given formal quasi-institutional grounding in the 
Committee of the Regions (CoR). Citied as an important innovation of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU, also known informally as the Maastricht Treaty)
101
 the CoR was 
seen as bringing regions into the EUs core institutions acting to implement subsidiarity 
as a tenant of EU policy.
102
 The impetus for the establishment of the CoR was to 
‘provide an official status for local and regional authorities within the EU’103 to ‘ensure 
that regions… [had] a political  voice of their own at the EU level.’104 Seeking to 
address ‘the variety of problems inherently linked… to integration’ such as democratic-
deficit and centralization of power to the Council and Commission, the CoR was seen as 
a pivotal pillar  in the ‘Europe of the Regions’ dialogue which dominated the study of 
MLG and inspired subnational movements during the late 1980s and into the 1990s.
105
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The CoR was seen as the first step towards a ‘third level’ of governance in Europe, 
whereby regions would assume policy competence in the decision-making process on 
par with EU institutions and member states to ‘countervail the dominance of nation-
states in European affairs… and to [tackle] 'new' political problems at the appropriate - 
the regional - level.’ 106  Thus the CoR was primarily an ‘institutional arrangement 
designed to broaden the social basis of EU policy making’107in the hope that  ‘by 
expanding the range of participants in the policy process, the EU [could] achieve greater 
legitimacy for the decisions taken at the supranational level and to improve chances of 
their successful implementation.’108 
 
The role of the CoR was not however on par with the aspirations of subnational parties 
preceding its establishment nor the academic discourse surrounding the optimism 
employed during the nascent years of the European Union.
 109
 Whilst on paper the CoR 
seems to represent an opportunity for subnational movements to collectively influence 
the EU, the effectiveness of this ‘institutional arrangement’ for subnational actors in 
practice is contested in terms of its capacity to empower them in the decision-making 
process.
110
 This is attributed to the role, composition and lack of real change in the CoR 
since its conception. The CoR primary position and role as a consultative body for the 
EU Commission, Council and Parliament ‘in certain policy fields impinging on regional 
responsibilities’111 has not changed considerably since its conception, whilst it is now an 
advisory body
112
 ‘the failure [of the CoR] to be recognized as an EU institution and to 
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achieve an active legislative role’113 over the past two decades has severely diminished 
its standing in the minds of subnational governments. Especially for larger subnational 
movements, state-less nations and regions with legislative authority, the lack of powers 
coupled with the composition of the CoR comprising a myriad of ‘municipal authorities 
and regions with no or weak legislative authority,’ 114 representing ‘all levels of sub-
member state government equally’115 has disappointed stronger nations and rendered 
their overall ‘influence… through the CoR … both diffuse and weak.’116  
Accordingly, the CoR has ‘been abandoned as a significant political forum for 
nationalist leaders,”117 owing to the lack of change and access to the decision-making 
process. This can be observed through the relationship that the SNP and CiU have had 
with the CoR over its history.  The CiU saw the CoR as an opportunity to engage with 
the formal structures of the EU, giving regions a strong voice in the EU as part of the 
CoR was seen as the first step in the ideal of a Europe of the Regions in which 
Catalonia, as one of the more prominent regions, would take a leading role. It offered a 
way to not merely bypass the Spanish state but to allow for the building of an 
architecture of asymmetric autonomy in which the European regions, nations without 
states, with ‘special personality’ were afforded special status within the EU to reduce 
the dominance of the nation state but not to supersede it.
118
 
The SNP, unlike the CiU, were less than optimistic at the prospect of the joining the 
CoR, with a spokesman stating that ‘involvement in a powerless committee is the most 
a devolved assembly could expect in terms of a place within EC structures… regional 
status would lock Scotland out of decision-making in the European Community – to the 
continued determent of our national interest.’119 The fear on the part of the SNP was 
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that assigning ‘Scotland a sub-state position’120 within the CoR was part of a unionist, 
central state, ‘strategy to keep Scotland subordinated within the United Kingdom [by] 
condemning it to a powerless position in the EC (EU).’121 Despite the hyperbolic nature 
of these statements the SNP did participate in the CoR however with only 4 of the 24 
places in the UK delegation
122
 assigned to Scotland and indeed their apprehensions 
regarding the CoR being vindicated after a decade of dissatisfaction and malaise with 
the CiU also espousing similar disappointment stating that ‘what we didn’t see was just 
how much judicial statehood mattered.’123  
Owing to the weakness of the CoR it has been ‘marginalized’ by the SNP and CiU as a 
forum for influence and thus direct empowerment by the CoR can be seen as minimal.
124
 
Indirectly however the failure of the CoR to address the aspirations of the SNP and CiU 
can be seen contribute to the establishment and expansion of alternative forums for 
access outside of the formal EU structure such as regional offices in Brussels and directly 
to the ‘REGLEG’ Group, Regions with Legislative Authority. The REGLEG includes 
Catalonia and Scotland as notable members, utilizing the collective mobilization of 
regions with similar legislative authority to lobby for special consideration not found in 
the CoR.
125
 This contributes to ‘challenge the notion that the EU harms regional 
power’ 126  as when one source of potential empowerment closes another is pursued 
outside the formal structure, the political isolation caused by the CoR has facilitated the 
creation of alternative forums which can be seen to empower regions.  
In summary, the CoR can both be seen to empower regions whilst similtariously  
delimiting their power and contributing to political isolation. The need for the stronger 
regions to ‘abandon’ the CoR and instead use the REGLEG as an outlet for gaining 
influence in the EU is a practical illustration of the failure of the CoR to adequately 
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fulfil the needs of both the CiU and SNP. From the perspective of the CiU and SNP the 
CoR can be viewed as a systemic demonstration of their limited role in the policy 
making process and the European opportunity structures. However despite the 
disappointment of the CoR for REGLEG regions recent changes under the Lisbon 
Treaty may revive some interest in enhanced participation in the Committee. With the 
CoR being turned into a ‘subsidiarity watchdog’ winning the right to ‘bring actions 
before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) if it feels the principle of subsidiarity has 
been infringed… the CoR can also go to the Court if it feels it has not been duly 
consulted by Commission, Council or Parliament.’127 This move may make the CoR a 
more potent force in the EU, with EU institutions having to take a more active interest 
in stances proposed by the Committee which is in stark opposition to the limited role it 
had before with the Commission and Council not being compelled to follow its 
recommendations.
128
These changes can be seen as a victory for regions who, most 
pertinently the CiU, lobbied for the CoR to be able to bring cases before the ECJ in the 
unratified Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE, European 
Constitution) .
129
 
Despite being described as paying ‘lip service’ to regional demands, ‘the CoR 
represented the first formal fruit at EU level, and [although] it was rather disappointing 
especially from the perspective of the more powerful regions, it nonetheless showed the 
regional issue to hit the political agenda.’130 This formal representation, however meek, 
does allow for the expansion of the regionalist cause but also is the most pertinent 
example of the limited role of regions in the EU causing political isolation and 
necessitating the need for secession to gain representation on par with H1 of this thesis. 
131
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Council of the European Union  (Council of Ministers)  
The European Council (Council of Ministers) is an integral institution in the EU 
responsible for representing the governments of each member state and in accordance 
with a Council-Centric perspective ‘is critically seen as the main and exclusive 
institution with legislative and executive power within the EU’ 132  and is thus 
‘considered by some to be the most powerful institutional actor in the EU.’133Owing to 
the Councils importance in the EU institutional architecture it has a prominent role in 
deciding and defining the scope of regions in the EU, as such it is afforded a special 
status in the agenda of subnational governments as the ability to gain influence within 
this institution would advance the regionalist cause. As such many subnational 
governments expend a large amount of political capital in dealing with the Council in 
order to gain influence, with the decisions made by the Council having an impact on 
regionalist agendas it plays a heightened role towards the aspirations of subnational 
movements. I will make a two-fold argument regarding the Council, firstly that the 
existing framework of access for subnational government, controlled by nation-states, 
leaves them political isolated in the EU and secondly that the changes to voting rules in 
the Lisbon Treaty disempower regions based on future membership whilst also 
dispelling part of the viability logic purported by subnational movements.  
 
As with the establishment of the CoR another development in regional representation 
ushered in by the TEU that fuelled optimistic speculation surrounding in the Europe of 
the Regions dialogue was the ability for ‘regional ministers to sit on member state 
delegations in the European Council. 
134
 This was seen as an important development, 
more so than the CoR, for subnational parties as it created an opportunity to access the 
heart of the decision-making of process within the EU. The critical element of this 
clause dictated that the arrangement is at the discretion of the member state, only when 
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‘participation is appropriate’135 and ‘where domestic law permits and regional matters 
are at stake’136 can regional ministers sit on the Council. An important pillar of the 
central argument maintained in academic discourse and advanced by subnational parties 
is that the national government act as a gatekeeper to EU decision-making for 
subnational governments.
137
 The rules concerning subnational access to the Council are 
illustrative of this point when you examine how this arrangement is implemented in 
practice for the SNP and CiU.  
The main argument for increased subnational participation in the Council relates to the 
lack of congruence between domestic and supranational policy competencies. The SNP 
and CiU as the principle parties leading regional governments are responsible for 
implementing EU law and regulations in line with their devolved competencies (in 
health, education and agriculture as examples) however their ability to participate in the 
EU decision- making process as a separate actor is limited and is at the discretion of the 
national government. This causes issues for subnational parties trying to assert their 
agenda in the EU policy realm and is the source of political isolation.
138
 Both the SNP 
and CiU can lobby their national governments to implement policy in the EU however 
this must go through the formal channels dictated by the national government. 
139
Examples of regions where regional governments have significant scope to advance 
their interests in the EU is Belgium where both Flemish and Walloon representatives 
have the right to represent the states in the Council as ‘external competences 
[correspond] exactly to their internal competences.’140 
However in the case of sending representatives to the Council the UK and Spanish 
governments have been less accommodating for their regions than the Belgian example. 
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Although the UK and Spain have indeed sent representatives from the SNP and CiU
141
 
this is an infrequent occurrence and the ability for these ministers to push a nationalist 
agenda in line with party policy is severely diminished by having to represent the 
interests of state and not their respective regions. The lack of direct official 
representation in EU policy making has created a divergence between regional 
competencies at the domestic level and that of the region at the supranational EU level 
in Spain and the UK.
142
 The Belgian case in comparison to the UK and Spain back 
Keating’s assertion that there ‘are mechanisms for regions to act, provided they first 
achieve victory in domestic constitutional arenas.
143
 
The lack of regular formalized access to the Council for the SNP and CiU, having to 
represent national and not regional interest, coupled with the central role of the nation 
state in dictating the terms and regularity of access all contribute to the Council fueling 
political isolation for the SNP and CiU. This is an area in which the EU empowers the 
nation state to disempower regions and accordingly this allocation of power from the EU 
to member states demonstrates to subnational movements their limited role in the EU as a 
region and not national entity fuelling the need for secession in line with H1.
144
 
Contradicting viability theory, the idea that European integration and economic 
interdependence has enabled smaller nations to contemplate independence
145
, are the 
changes to voting that will come into effect in 2014 for the European Council. These 
changes under the auspices of the Lisbon Treaty can be seen as a demarcation from the 
stipulation that smaller states can hold a prominent position in the EU on par with the 
larger member states. The changes to come into effect in the European council 
disincentives subnational governments from becoming independent based on size, 
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although these nations will have their own voice it will be significantly smaller than it 
would have been under previous treaties. Voting changes have shifted to favour larger 
member states based on a reflection of population size, ‘reducing the current over-
weighting for smaller member states.’ 146 Based on population size Scotland would 
factor in around Finland and Catalonia close to Bulgaria (illustrated in figure 1). 
Judging these two countries as proxy the voting weight potential for Scotland and 
Catalonia has halved within the Council, delimiting their potential influence. This again 
emphasizes the centrality of the large unitary nation state at the heart of the EU 
decision-making process, the ‘UK, with a population of 62 million, of a total EU 
population of 504 million, will have just over 12 per cent of the vote. Scotland has 1 per 
cent of the EU population.’ 147 
The rationale for amending the voting in the Council found in the Lisbon Treaty can be 
seen to stem from The Treaty of Nice re-weighting, this was done due to the 
‘dissatisfaction among large EU states with what they perceived to be a considerable 
overweighing of the influence of small and medium-sized countries in EU decision-
making.’148 Addressing the much lorded examples employed by the SNP and other 
subnational parties of smaller member states, such as ‘ireland and Denmark… whose 
leaders believed that they had gained influence in the EU out of proportion to their 
economic importance or size,’149 this process contributes to back the assertions made to 
counter viability theory at the time of Maastricht, stating that ‘small states would 
[eventually] get swamped by large ones and by the institutions of the EU.’150 
In summary, the Council can be seen as a vassal of national interest in the EU, it 
provides a strong example of the limit of the SNP and CiU to access the most important 
legislative body in the EU, exemplifying how the national context is an important aspect 
of subnational empowerment. After appraising the literature contending with the 
relationship between the Council, subnational and national governments this thesis 
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would conclude that it offers compelling evidence of an area in which political isolation 
occurs for subnational parties vindicating H1 and H2 alike.  
Figure 1: The changes in vote weights for the 28 EU countries under QMV (qualified 
majority voting) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Häge, F. LSE Euroblog. 
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European Parliament (EP) 
This section will argue that the European Parliament (EP) has a limited role in 
empowering subnational movements, despite attempting to advance regional issues in 
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the EU, its lack of influence vis-a-vis the Council and the importance of national 
context in determining electoral success makes it less important opportunity structure 
for subnational movements. The European Parliament, in the same vein as the CoR, was 
a pivotal part of the formative political opportunity structures in the 1980s and 1990s 
that inspired ‘minority parties to enter the European political game.’ 152 The EP formed 
an important part of the ‘institutional incentives’ for subnational parties as direct 
elections to another parliament, especially in the years preceding devolution in Scotland, 
outside of the national arena allowed these parties to change their discourse and focus 
on a different policy forum in which to capture votes of support for their respective 
nationalist causes.
153
 Despite the promise of the EP in offering an alternative 
opportunity structure to bypass the state it has not yielded much by way of influence for 
the SNP and CiU.   
The EP is characteristic of the sui generis nature of the EU, being the only ‘directly 
elected supranational assembly in the world’154 makes it fundamentally different from 
any established traditional political arena. The institutional system of the EU has no 
relation to national politics in which ‘parties almost have a monopoly on the structuring 
of political life,’155 in the EU interest groups and lobbies have a more prominent role. 
national parties are organized into Eurogroups (Europarties) along ideological lines 
however ‘carry out practically non of the central functions of parties in a parliamentary 
regime.’156  These rather acute differences between the typical national and atypical 
supranational parliaments at its most disparate rests on the fact that in the EP ‘there is 
no majority government and no opposition’157 as power in the EU ‘rests on the logic 
of… consensus as the habitual decision-making procedure.’158  
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Europarties are described as being more ‘virtual’ than ‘real’ with tangible pragmatic 
power playing out in elite negotiations. 
159
  For the SNP and CiU who do not hold a 
considerable amount of power within their respective Europarties, this translates to a 
forum in which they can affect little influence. Although the EP has been empowered by 
successive enlargements to its authority there remains many structural limitations which 
delimits its influence and actual power vis-a-vis the Council.
160
 Accordingly, ‘the fact 
that it is not the central institution in the EU explains why is not the principle means 
used by national parties to influence community policies,’ 161  this also extends to 
regional parties. 
An important consideration when examining the EP as a forum for determining how 
effective the EP is in empowering regions is the salience of national context to the EP. 
The national context is pivotal in understanding subnational parties in the EP, this is due 
to the assertion that: 
 
 ‘the election and reelection prospects of almost all MEPs (Members of European 
Parliament) have more to do with the position of the MEPs’ national party in the 
domestic arena – such as the party’s governing status, the timing of the European 
Parliament election in the national (subnational) electoral cycle, and the 
performance of the national government.’ 162 
 
Owing to this point, the domestic political conditions have much by way of influence in 
the impact of EP elections for subnational parties. The SNP and CiU both view the EP 
as ‘a visible platform from which [they can] communicate [their] political project, both 
in the European and national contexts’163 however the limited numbers of MEPs, and 
the weak standing of the EP has contributed to diminish the ‘expectations about the real 
changes that could derive from participation in this institution.’164 The limited number 
of MEPs that can go to the EP from these regions is due to the fact that EP elections are 
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conducted in line with state legislation, this can mean that the ‘regional base have great 
difficulty in winning seats, because the State territory is treated as a single 
constituency.’165  The limited profile of the MEPs that are elected from these regions 
also means that these elections are more important, and primarily used, for raising 
awareness of subnational issues on the domestic stage, especially in periods where the 
‘domestic political opportunities [for the SNP and CiU]… are closed.’ 166 
 
Despite the comparatively weak standing of the EP to the Council and as an opportunity 
structure to subnational parties the EP can and has been used to advance the regionalist 
cause and standing within the EU. The EP Resolution 1 is cited as an example of this, 
arguing that ‘it is essential for scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity to extend to the 
regional and local levels in the Member States.’ 167The Resolution called for ‘national 
parliaments to consult the regional parliaments with legislative powers’168 on issues 
pertaining to regional competencies.
 
This can be viewed as an institutional gesture of 
goodwill however it demonstrates that the regionalist agenda is considered within the 
EP, with the institutional leverage offered within the EP acting to advance the cause of 
parties heading regional governments with legislative competencies such as the SNP 
and CiU. The EP supporting regions is not unprecedented however, with the Parliament 
putting ‘pressure’ for the ‘establishment of formal rights of consultation with the 
Community (EU)’ and ‘stressed for the greater involvement of regions’ in the late 1980s 
which all contributed to help establish the CoR.
169
 
In summary, the EP can be seen to not empower the SNP and CiU, although it allowed 
for the expansion of their nationalist aspirations in the late 1980s and 1990s in practice 
this has made for a forum in which they have little influence. The importance of the EP 
translates not to influence in the EU but in generating publicity and support in the 
domestic domain.  
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European Commission (COM) 
This section will argue that the European Commission (COM) is the most pertinent 
example of an ally to regions however could do more to empower subnational actors 
with legislative power such as Catalonia and Scotland. The COM plays a central role in 
the pantheon of the EU institutional structure as it has the right of initiative; this means 
that they have the power to ‘propose laws for adoption by the European Parliament and 
Council of the EU.’170 The central role they play in the EU policy formation process 
make it an important institution for subnational parties, groups, lobbies and 
governments to push their respective agendas.
 171
Their role is made more important for 
subnational groups as the COM ‘has virtually a free hand in creating new networks, and 
in this way it is able to reach out to new constituencies, including a variety of 
subnational groups.’172 An example of the COM utilizing this functional prerogative, 
and an area in which it can be viewed to empower regions, is its role in the creation of 
the Committee of the Regions (CoR).  The COM is seen as a ‘long standing ally of 
regions and locatilites having a role in the EU policy making process’ 173which can be 
attributed to their role in creating the CoR. Firslty establishing an Advisory Council for 
Local and Regional Authroities in 1988 in the hope that it would ‘mobilsze support 
from below for a partnership approach to strutural programmeing in which the 
Commission, national and subnational authroites would jointly design, finance, and 
implement economic development programmes.’ 174  The creation of the Advisory 
Council ‘laid the groundwork’175 for the eventual creation in 1993 of the CoR, this 
coupled with pressure by strong regions in Belgium and the German Lander.  
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The principle of subsiderarity is important when examining the role of the COM for 
subnational empowerment, it is also a critical factor driving political isolation for 
subnational actors; as expectations regarding what this entails vis-a-vis the practice of 
this principle have been unrealistic.
 176
The principle of subsidiarity entails that decisions 
should be made at the most appropriate level of government, that is, if policy can be 
conducted and implemented at a local level, then accordingly it should be delegated from 
the national to the local.
177
 This also applies in the supranational-national domain which 
made the principle popular for nation-states, especially amongst more notable 
Eurosceptic countries such as the UK and Denmark, ‘as a brake to the centralizing forces 
of the EU.’178 The prominent subnational governments and parties, in Scotland, Flanders, 
Catalonia and the Lander ‘focused on it as a general principle to argue that they ought to 
be afforded a more prominent place in the decision-making process.’179 Accordingly the 
principle of subsidiarity has long been at the centre of the European stateless nations' 
ambitions to increase their degree of political autonomy from the state.  
Expectations for what subsideraity could glean for subnational parties have however 
proved unrealisitc which rests on a preception problem. This preception problem relates 
to how the principle is enacted, with the national context taking on, again, a principle 
role in implementation. As ‘the E.U. project is to be built on the existing nation-
states’180 the ‘transfer of political power to the regions should never undermine the 
pivotal role of these central governments.’181 For the CiU and SNP the prospect of being 
able to practically utilize this principle is severely diminished due to the centrality of the 
state in this relationship. The COM has done little to ameliorate this impasse and 
empower these regions to take on a more prominent role to reduce the dominance of the 
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state in the EU. The lack of recent support also goes some way to dispel the idea that the 
Commission empowers subnational movements, most notably with the Commission 
President publically rejecting the claims made by the SNP that an independent Scotland 
would enjoy Continuity of Effect in its relationship with the EU in the wake of a 
Scottish yes vote on independence from the United Kingdom.
182
 Overall, the COM can 
be seen to have both extended the scope of regional influence in the EU however have 
not addressed the role of regions with legislative powers, alienating the SNP and CiU 
from the policy making process. With their brief to introduce policy the COM could go 
further to empower regions in line with their previous empowerments of regions.  
Brussels Regional Offices 
This section will demonstrate that subnational regional offices based in Brussels have 
endowed the subnational governments of Scotland and Catalonia with ‘access’ to the 
EU, offering a dais in which to enter into dialogue ‘in the exchange of ideas and policy 
initiatives’183 within the EU. However, despite these offices allowing Catalonia and 
Scotland to gain a voice in the discursive space of the EU they have had little effect on 
the decision-making process of the EU as they operate outside of its formal structure, 
nevertheless they do provide subnational governments with a forum in which to raise 
awareness of economic and political issues within their regions at the EU level.
184
 
Regional offices emerged from the early 1980s as regions looked to expand their access 
to the European Union and are an informal avenue for subnational governments to 
lobby the institutions of the EU, notably the Commission and Parliament. These offices 
are expected to ‘monitor EU activities, provide an early warning about forthcoming 
legislation, and present [subnational – Catalan and Scottish] views to [EU] Officials.’185 
Subnational regional offices ‘are among the most widely used lobbying tools… 
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established by Scotland and Catalonia’186 to exert political influence in the EU, for 
larger regions, like those concerned, this extends to an aspiration to influence EU 
decision-making in the EU Council, Commission and Parliament.
187
 
However how are these ambitions for influence met in reality for the SNP and CiU? 
What effect have subnational offices had? Scotland has two distinct regional offices in 
Brussels both based at in the same building at Scotland House. The first, Scotland 
Europa, ‘a conglomerate of Scottish public and private organizations has represented 
Scottish interests in Europe since 1992.’ 188  Following devolution the office was 
expanded to improve lobbying for Scottish interest in the Commission and other EU 
institutions however despite enlargement their influence is still seen as minimal in 
influencing the Commission and other EU institutions
189
Despite this Scotland Europa is 
still seen as a positive outlet for Scottish interest in the EU, it at least allows for Scottish 
issues to be heard and for the coordination of Scottish EU policy
190
. The second office 
is the Scottish Government European Union office (SGEUO) established by the newly 
devolved Scottish Parliament following devolution it is used to ‘support Government 
work on EU policy… report on events and policy developments in Brussels to Ministers 
and officials, identify key issues for Scotland, and communicate to key EU partners 
what the Scottish Government's views are.’191  However the SGEUO, as an official 
government office, are part of the UK Permanent Representation in Brussels (UKREP). 
When the SNP came to power there have been some changes in how the SGEUO 
operates within the UKREP group, Scottish representatives under the Scottish Labour 
Party (SLP) used to attend weekly meetings with the other members of the UKREP 
delegations in order to coordinate EU policy and to make sure there was congruence in 
stance and to lobby as a group. Since taking office the SNP have not been invited to 
these meetings and instead conducts most of its business as a separate enetiity, this has 
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not caused much tension with the UKREP however it does delimit the influence of the 
SGEUO.
192
 
The fact that the Catalonian regional office, Patronat Pro Europa, opened
193
 before the 
Spanish state even became a member of the EEC is testament to the significance the 
Catalonian Government places on its influence in Europe. Taking the form of a 
foundation combining political parties, ‘local administrations, universities, commercial 
establishments, savings banks, trade unions and Chambers of Commerce’ 194  into a 
single regional office makes it a ‘giant’ of subnational regional offices. 195 The Patronat 
Pro Europa is considered one of the most influential and powerful regional offices in 
the EU and within this framework the CiU plays a central role in coordinating and 
managing the scope and direction of lobbying activity, most notably in language 
recognition for Catalonia. It plays a similar role as Scotland Europa and the SGEUO in 
its aspirations however its size and the amount of finical leverage behind it makes it 
much more efficient in carrying out these aims. The notable difference between 
Catalonian and Scottish offices is the bypassing of the state, the Patronat Pro Europa 
runs autonomously from the Spanish state and operated as an unofficial embassy for 
Catalnia until 2004 when the region opened its own embassy in Brussels signifying its 
ambitions to be recognized as an important independent player, separate from Spain.  
The Catalonian presence in Brussels has met with some contention in Madrid, with an 
attempt to limit its scope proving unsuccessful owing to a EU ruling. 
196
 It is also 
criticized by other Catalan parties for acting  ‘as a personal fiefdom of CiU’197  for 
‘having monopolized Catalan participation in the process of integration and employing 
its cosy position with the central government to protect the interests of Catalan 
industrialists and business at the European level.’198 Despite the amount of political and 
economic capital invested in these offices the ‘initial hope that deeper integration would 
                                                          
192
 Keating, European Integration and the Nationalities Question,  p. 367-388.   
193
 Opened in 1982, 10 years before Scotland Europa.  
194
 Nagel, Transcending the National/Asserting the National: How Stateless Nations like Scotland, 
Wales and Catalonia react to European Integration, p. 63.   
195
 Marks et al, What Do Subnational Offices Think They Are Doing in Brussels?, p. 12. 
196
 Vazquex-Garcia et al.,  Spain: Party Attitudes Towards the EU in the Member States: Parties for 
European, Parties Against Europe, p. 110.  
197
 Giordano & Roller, Catalonia and the 'Idea of Europe': Competing Strategies and Discourses 
within Catalan Party Politics, p. 110 
198
 Ibid, p. 110.  
MSc Thesis 
Friend or Foe? The European Union and Subnational Independence Movements 
Thomas E. C. Scarff  
14
th
 July 2014 
 
 
46 
 
allow the Catalan government to bypass the national state in its dealings with the EU 
has faded.’199 
Overall regional offices allow for subnational parties to enter into the discursive space 
of the EU to raise awareness of their nationalist platforms. It does not represent an 
example of political isolation in the same vein as the other opportunity structures of the 
EU as it is informal in nature. These offices were created under the auspices of these 
movements in order to ameliorate the isolation they faced in the national sphere. For 
this reason regional offices can be seen as empowering regions. Although they have no 
formal standing and little influence, their mere existence demonstrates that the EU can 
glean for these movements a space to transcend the state and advance their interests. 
The EU allowing for these offices to reside in Brussels, sometimes, as in Spain, against 
the bequest of national governments, shows that the EU recognizes their role in 
influencing discussion surrounding the EU policy process.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the European Union can be viewed as both a friend and a foe to 
subnational movements. The EU has allowed for the empowerment of subnational 
movements in the creation of new opportunity structures above that of the state, such as 
the CoR and European Parliament, which have gleaned for them a new discursive space 
in which to operate outside of the national sphere, allowing the SNP and CiU to frame 
independence in a way that appeals to voters. Merely existing as an alternative forum 
atop the prerogative of the state the EU empowers subnational movements in endowing 
them with the agency to pursue independence. In this regard the EU can be seen to 
empower these movements.  
However, the evaluation of EU opportunity structures outlined in this thesis shows that 
owing to the centrality of the state in the EU system, these parties are political isolated 
and do not gain the influence in line with their aspirations. This conclusion vindicates 
the central argument of this that the current configuration of opportunity structures in 
the EU has isolated subnational actors as illustrated by the SNP and CiU. The 
hypothesis,  ‘Greater political isolation precipitates an increased drive for autonomy and 
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secession for subnational governments,’ can also be seen to be true when examining 
these parties relationship with opportunity structures and nation states. The need for 
these parties to pursue secession as a means to gain access to the decision-making 
process shows that political isolation is an important mechanism driving this process.  
The EU, coupled with national governments, have to not merely appease these 
movements but give them real influence in the system. In order for the extent of 
political isolation to diminish national governments have to relinquish power to 
Scotland and Catalonia in regards to EU access, and the EU has to make it easier for 
these movements to gain more access without going through the nation state. Unless 
this is done Scotland and Catalonia will not yield in the pursuit of independence, in 
giving these movements increased formal access thus addressing political isolation it 
may quell secessionist aspirations, not doing so will mean that the road to session will 
be continued upon.  
The Lisbon Treaty can be seen to represent this relationship of empowerment and 
disempowerment and highlights the political isolation faced by these movements. The 
increase in the scope of the CoR to be able to bring cases before the ECJ is a positive 
step towards bringing regions into the formal stricture of the EU decision-making 
process, however the changes to voting in the Council emthsisies that despite some 
incremental changes to the system the nation state is still the primary actor in the EU. 
The marked limited success of individual and collective efforts of subnational parties to 
make an impact ‘seems to confirm that not only has the march towards a Europe of the 
Regions stalled, but that it is even going into reverse,’ 200echoing the central argument 
of this thesis that ‘it is clear that this, far from being a Europe of the Regions, is still a 
Europe of the Nation-states.’201  
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